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ABSTRACT 
 
During the past 20 years, Chile has implemented several strategies to enhance its 
visibility and reputation in the world. These efforts have been primarily targeted at the 
United States, Europe and Asia, aiming to position the country as a stable and blossoming 
nation that escapes some unfavourable stereotypes associated with Latin America. A 
different perspective arises when looking at neighbouring nations. People from Bolivia, 
Peru and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, have a less positive image of Chile, an issue that 
has impacted the relation with these countries particularly in areas such as trade, energy 
and even security, with Chile sometimes being labelled an ‘isolated’ nation. This article 
suggests that an extension of these initiatives to the neighbouring countries may 
contribute to ease tensions and serve as a future reserve of soft power. The case of Chile 
may be relevant to illustrate how small and medium-sized states attempt to capture the 
attention of foreign publics, as well as advancing the debate concerning the different 
audiences that should be considered when crafting national images. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2010, after several years of negotiations, Chile became the first South 
American country – and the second in Latin America after Mexico – to join the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD (OECD, 2010). 
According to the OECD, Chile represented a success story to the whole world, with two 
uninterrupted decades of democracy and economic development, an average growth of 5 
per cent per year, an important reduction of poverty, prudent tax policies, and a 
responsible management of the 2008 global financial crisis. Some media reports 
celebrated the announcement as a confirmation that Chile was ‘well ahead of any other 
Latin American countries’ (Long, 2010). The news could also be interpreted as a triumph 
for Chilean diplomacy, which had been working hard to position Chile as a stable and 
blossoming nation in the global imaginary. Not surprisingly, the invitation to join the 
OECD was perceived as a threshold to the first world, a call to be part of the global club 
of developed countries (Abarca Lucero, 2009). 
 
Two months later, however, Chilean diplomacy faced a very different scenario. The 
country was forced to respond to a lawsuit filed in 2008 by Peru before the International 
Court of Justice, to resolve a claim for 35 000 square km of the Pacific Ocean currently 
under Chilean sovereignty (Xinhua, 2010). Although the verdict will not be known before 
late 2013, this move taken by Peru illustrated the failure of earlier attempts to find a 
negotiated solution, showing the futility of some goodwill gestures previously made by 
Chilean diplomacy, such as returning thousands of books stolen during the War of the 
Pacific in the late nineteenth century (La Nación, 2007). 
 
Both episodes are symptoms of a contradiction that Chile seems to be experiencing. On 
one hand, during the past 20 years, the country has employed several strategies aimed at 
enhancing its visibility and reputation in the eyes of the world, particularly those of the 
United States, the European Union and the main economies of Asia. On the other, 
relations with its neighbours – more specifically Bolivia and Peru – during the same 
period have been stained by different episodes of tension, demonstrating the limited soft 
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power that Chile possesses within its own region. In addition to the impasse with Peru, 
the last decade has witnessed disputes with Bolivia and Argentina, with only narrow 
success in building alliances with other Latin American nations during these episodes. 
 
While Chile’s strategies to improve its reputation and visibility have been appropriately 
aligned with two of the main goals of the country’s foreign policy – the 
internationalization of the economy and a growing insertion into the international 
community (Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008; Embassy of Chile to the United 
States, 2013; Fuentes and Fuentes, forthcoming) – a third goal has apparently not met the 
same degree of success: a proactive involvement within Latin America. Thus, while the 
country’s security has not been directly threatened, these disputes have affected matters 
such as energy, trade and international reputation. Although Chile is still seen as an 
economic model for the region, on various occasions it has been labelled an ‘isolated 
country’, ‘the rich kid on the block’ or even ‘the new Phoenicians of Latin America’ (for 
example The Economist, 2004; Rother, 2004). On the basis of an analysis of domestic 
and international news reports, this article suggests that public diplomacy and nation 
branding can arguably be effective tools to augment Chile’s popularity among its 
neighbours, contributing to reduce tensions with these nations and paving the way for 
more concrete future achievements. 
 
ICEBERGS, SURPRISES AND A COUNTRY THAT ‘WORKS WELL’ 
 
In recent years, the attention of several authors has been drawn to the public diplomacy of 
small and medium-sized states (for example, Leonard and Small, 2003; Batora, 2005; 
Cooper, 2009; Gilboa, 2009; Park, 2009). Owing to the limited material resources of 
these states, public diplomacy and nation branding can be useful instruments to influence 
the global agenda and even contribute to the development of these countries (Anholt, 
2005). However, in contrast with major powers, which will always be in the public eye 
notwithstanding their actions, small and medium-sized states may sometimes simply wish 
to capture attention in order to counteract their lack of visibility in the global imaginary 
(Batora, 2005). The case of Chile can be useful to illustrate this point, and may also be 
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relevant to advance the debate regarding the different global and regional audiences that 
countries should take into account when crafting their national images. 
 
Although Chile’s economic transformation, which started in the mid-1970s, was 
positively regarded among some international elites, the country became a pariah in the 
international realm during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Thus, Chile was 
perceived as the home of one of the longest authoritarian regimes in South America, in 
which human rights were violated with impunity (Prieto Larraín, 2011). Once Chile 
recovered democracy in 1990, some of the main goals established for its foreign policy 
were the internationalization of the economy, involvement within the international 
community and a proactive participation in Latin America (Fuentes and Fuentes, 
forthcoming). Given that the economic model of the country drives it to search for new 
markets and attract investments, Chile paid special attention to the image it was 
projecting to the world, most particularly to shake off the shadow of the Pinochet years 
and improve its international reputation (Abarca Lucero, 2009; Prieto Larraín, 2011). 
 
A clear example comes from 1992, when the country participated in the Universal 
Exhibition of Seville. The main attraction of its pavilion was an iceberg, brought directly 
from Antarctica. Its exact meaning was a matter of dispute at a domestic and international 
level, but the commission in charge of the Chilean pavilion in Seville attempted to 
differentiate the country from its Latin American counterparts, associated with 
stereotypes of chaos and inefficiency. Instead, Chile was portrayed as a cold, serious and 
formal nation, highlighting its recovered democracy, economic success, as well as its 
natural resources (Abarca Lucero, 2009; Korowin, 2010; Prieto Larraín, 2011). Several 
Chilean scholars debated about the alleged emphasis on consumerism represented by the 
iceberg; however, the idea was considered a success because it allowed Chile to be ‘seen’ 
by the world (Abarca Lucero, 2009; Korowin, 2010; for an example of the coverage, see 
The New York Times, 1991). 
 
In the following years, trade arguably became the main driver behind Chile’s interest in 
promoting its image abroad. Under the management of ProChile (the Chilean Trade 
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Commission), the country developed different marketing strategies to broaden and 
diversify its exports attempting to migrate from exporting raw materials to creating 
products with a higher added value (Prieto Larraín, 2011; ProChile, 2013). In the mid-
2000s, the need to give these campaigns more consistency and cohesion led ProChile to 
outline for the very first time a strategy of nation branding that would involve every 
sector of society and would be the nucleus of the actions behind commercial and 
economic positioning (Abarca Lucero, 2009). This strategy would communicate three 
main ideas about Chile: a spectacular, diverse and transparent geography; the warmth and 
efficiency of its people; and the stability and strength of its institutions (Abarca Lucero, 
2009). While the idea of a nation brand enjoyed consensus within the country, some of 
the strategies implemented by ProChile were rather controversial, such as the short-lived 
slogan ‘Chile, All Ways Surprising’ (Zárate, 2009; The Economist, 2010). 
 
The year 2009 brought a shift in direction, with the creation of Fundación Imagen de 
Chile, a new institution aimed at coordinating and capitalizing the public and private 
efforts that help to promote Chile across the world (Fundación Imagen de Chile, 2013a). 
In 2010, ‘Chile hace bien’, meaning both ‘Chile is good for you’ and ‘Chile works well’, 
was unveiled as the guiding concept for the actions to follow, in an attempt to emphasise 
Chile’s stability and reliability. While the double meaning of that concept could be 
replicated in languages like Portuguese, for English-speaking countries only the first 
translation was chosen; therefore the idea of the country’s efficiency was overlooked 
(The Economist, 2010). 
 
Albeit some of the officers of the Fundación have described its work as public diplomacy 
(Fundación Imagen de Chile, 2009), it seems its current efforts are still understood almost 
exclusively in terms of nation branding. This may perhaps be related to the fact that the 
context in which the Fundación works is not remarkably different, given that the foreign 
policy of the country has not undergone radical changes, and trade still plays a significant 
role in positioning Chile abroad (Bakit, 2011). However, while ProChile focussed its 
actions on the United States, the European Union and Asia, where Chile’s main economic 
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interests lie today (Abarca Lucero, 2009), the Fundación did not seem to have a clear 
geographic strategy. 
 
EARTHQUAKES, MINERS AND STUDENTS: THE GLOBAL MEDIA 
PERSPECTIVE ON CHILE 
 
The strategies led by both ProChile and Fundación Imagen de Chile have relied strongly 
on marketing and public relations, with the guidance of agencies such as Interbrand and 
Ogilvy Public Relations (Mercopress, 2004; Ogilvy Public Relations, 2011), and the 
advice of expert Simon Anholt (Anholt, 2009). These campaigns have included 
organizing seminars, participating in international fairs, press trips, paid advertisements 
in newspapers, promotional videos and websites in several languages. (Fundación Imagen 
de Chile, 2011a; see also the website www.thisischile.cl). The budget has been modest, 
and only once the Fundación received US$10 million for a whole year (The Economist, 
2010), a sum that was subsequently reduced in the following years and is considerably 
low compared to the annual US$20 million invested by Costa Rica or the $15 million 
spent by Peru (González, 2012). 
 
However, as with several small and medium-sized states (Leonard and Small, 2003; 
Batora, 2005), the main challenge for Chile has historically been the scarce attention it 
has received from the global media. More worryingly, it continues to be associated with 
the Pinochet dictatorship (Markessinis, 2009). Consequently, Fundación Imagen de Chile 
has attempted to draw the interest of international journalists to other matters, such as the 
Dakar Rally (a motorcycle competition held since 2009 in Argentina and Chile, and in 
later editions Peru), the ALMA telescope (the most powerful in the world, built in the 
Atacama Desert) or the country’s tourist attractions (such as the capital Santiago, chosen 
by Lonely Planet as one of the 10 best cities to visit in 2012) (ThisisChile.cl, 2013). The 
fact that some of these stories have effectively been picked up by media around the world 
(see, for instance, AFP, 2011; Gosh, 2011; Leung, 2011) could be considered a sign of 
the success of these campaigns. 
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However, the attention of international journalists has not in fact been fully focused on 
these events. According to some studies by Fundación Imagen de Chile, almost a third of 
the coverage the country receives by the international media is related to sports, 
especially because of Chilean football players who participate in European and Latin 
American leagues (Fundación Imagen de Chile, 2013b; Salvo, 2013). In addition, the 
most widely covered news stories about the country in the last couple of years have been 
totally unexpected situations, which is somewhat ironic, considering that the former 
slogan ‘All ways surprising’ was eliminated precisely because the stability and 
predictability were arguably more representative of the country (The Economist, 2010). 
These stories are the February 2010 earthquake, the rescue of the 33 miners in October of 
the same year (Pujol, 2010), and to a lesser extent, the 2011 student demonstrations 
(Fundación Imagen de Chile, 2011b). 
 
Interestingly enough, the first two were originally framed as disasters, yet ultimately 
proved useful to portray the country in a more positive light. For instance, in the 
aftermath of the earthquake, the global media initially focused on the most dramatic 
aspects of the story, such as the magnitude of the quake (8.8 Richter, 500 times more 
powerful than the one that had devastated Haiti a month earlier), the destruction of towns 
and cities and the number of victims (Pujol, 2011). However, journalists soon realized 
that the death toll was low considering the magnitude of the quake and the level of 
destruction was not as severe as originally expected. Consequently, the focus shifted to 
the country’s capacity to respond effectively to this catastrophe, praising the successful 
application of anti-seismic laws, which were seen as evidence of good governance and 
control of corruption, as well as the economic strength of the country, with its prosperity 
considered a relevant factor behind this effective preparation (Kaufmann and Tessada, 
2010; Pujol, 2011). Some reports even proposed Chile as a model of anti-seismic 
construction for the United States (Welch, Vergano and Hawley, 2010) and a couple of 
months later, a delegation of Chilean architects travelled to the Expo Shanghai to 
promote their work as a ‘miracle of anti-seismic architecture’ (Chilearch, 2010). 
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In the case of the miners, what had begun as a terrible accident finally emerged as 
probably one of the most important accomplishments for Chile’s global image. The 
rescue of the 33 men trapped 688 m underground for almost 70 days was followed live on 
television by a billion spectators, making it one of the most viewed media events ever 
(Franklin, 2011). This success was not random. The Chilean government tightly managed 
the communications of the event2 in order to ensure the story would not only be a source 
of inspiration, but would also portray the country as an example of success and efficiency 
(Franklin, 2011). The global media followed this narrative, with The Wall Street Journal 
claiming that the rescue was ‘a smashing victory for free-market capitalism’ (Henninger, 
2010), and The Washington Post arguing that this was a reward to Chile’s ‘20-year 
record as Latin America’s most free country’ (The Washington Post, 2010). 
Consequently, although some authors considered the event as a ‘rebranding’ of Chile 
(Jones, 2010), the rescue of the miners could also be seen as a means to attract the 
attention of the international media towards the very issues that the country has attempted 
to communicate to the world over the past two decades. 
 
The conflict with the students has been more problematic. Some influential media have 
seen the demonstrations against the current Chilean educational system as grounds to 
criticize the country’s socio-economic model and the local authorities (Fundación Imagen 
de Chile, 2011b). To mention a few examples, for the BBC, the violent clashes between 
police and students reminded the world of those that occurred during Pinochet’s 
dictatorship (Long, 2011); The Economist remarked on ‘the exorbitant cost of for-profit 
universities’ (The Economist, 2011) and how the conflict arguably revealed the economic 
inequalities and the lack of legitimacy of Chile’s political class (The Economist, 2012); 
                                                 
2 The Chilean authorities produced an official live television broadcast of the rescue. In different 
interviews, government officials denied any type of political exploitation of the event and held that the 
broadcast simply intended to prevent the alleged chaos that would be produced by a large number of 
journalists trying to cover the story at the same time (for example, Cooperativa, 2010). However, according 
to American journalist Jonathan Franklin, the Chilean authorities kept a strict supervision over all the 
videos released when the workers were still trapped underground, editing out images of the men ill or 
crying. He claimed that during the rescue several restrictions were placed on the accredited media, adopting 
measures such as blocking the view of cameras and photographers with a giant Chilean flag, in order to 
prevent alternative shots of the operation. Moreover, an avalanche would have occurred inside the mine 
while they were still rescuing the workers, a fact that remained unnoticed by the journalists covering the 
story (Franklin, 2011). 
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and The Financial Times described how the protests ‘have turned Sebastián Piñera into 
the country’s least-loved president since the return of democracy in 1990 and exposed 
serious social discontent’ (Webber, 2011). But while the conflict is far from being 
resolved, it is still not clear what impact it has had on the country’s image abroad.  
 
On a global level, Chile is far from being the most successful country in terms of 
reputation and image. In 2012 it was listed only as number 38 among the 50 countries of 
the Nation Branding Index and as the 34th out of 118 countries in the Country Brand 
Index of 2012 (Fundación Imagen de Chile, 2011c; FutureBrand, 2012; Salvo, 2013). 
According to some of these rankings, however, it remains among the Latin American 
nations with the most positive image and in 2012 was listed as number 2 in 
FutureBrand’s ranking of 15 ‘Tomorrow’s Leading Country Brands’ (FutureBrand, 
2012). Other numbers are also favourable: its economy is one of the strongest in the 
region, the country has signed almost 60 free trade agreements so far, has twice occupied 
nonpermanent seats in the United Nations Security Council and has participated in 
several international multilateral initiatives (Fuentes and Fuentes, forthcoming). Albeit it 
is not possible to determine the exact contribution of Chile’s nation branding and public 
diplomacy strategies to these accomplishments, at least it appears that they have been 
effectively aligned with two of the main objectives of the country’s foreign policy: the 
internationalization of the economy and its increasing participation within the 
international community. However, when looking at a third aim mentioned earlier – the 
proactive involvement within Latin America – the situation looks more troublesome, 
especially when analysing the relations with Chile’s neighbouring countries. 
 
‘THE RICH KID ON THE BLOCK’: CHILE AND THE STRAINED 
RELATION WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS 
 
Although during the 1980s several Latin American countries expressed their solidarity 
with those Chileans who were against the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, the recovery 
of democracy also meant the return of old differences, which have been partly aggravated 
by the economic success of the Chilean model (Rother, 2004). Particularly, relations with 
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its three neighbours – Bolivia, Peru and, to a lesser extent, Argentina – have been 
somewhat strained, following a pattern that started to appear towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, despite the common history shared by these countries. To mention 
only a few examples, Argentinean hero José de San Martín brought independence to 
Chile (Gutiérrez Escudero, 2007) and both San Martín and Chilean founding father 
Bernardo O’Higgins fought for the liberation of Peru (Encyclopedia of Nationalism, 
2001). In fact, according to a survey published by Chilean newspaper La Tercera in 2010 
(La Tercera, 2010), 78 per cent of Peruvians and 61 per cent of Bolivians do not trust 
Chileans, and 37 per cent of Argentinians believe that Chile is the least friendly country 
in Latin America. Similarly, a 2012 survey by Fundación Imagen de Chile showed that, 
although Peruvians admire Chile’s economic success, they hold that Chileans are known 
for being aggressive and cold. The same study assessed that, while Argentinians have a 
mostly positive image of Chile, lauding its economic and social progress, they could not 
understand why Chileans preferred order and security instead of joy and freedom, and 
around a quarter of the people surveyed in that country qualified Chileans as cold, unkind 
and individualistic (González, 2012). 
 
However, this does not mean there have not been achievements. Chile has signed 
economic agreements with a majority of the countries in the region and has solved 
several territorial disputes (Fuentes and Fuentes, forthcoming). Some of the studies 
mentioned earlier observe that Chile has a very good reputation among citizens of Brazil, 
Mexico and Colombia (González, 2012). In addition, the last time the security of the 
country was actually threatened was in 1978, when Chile and Argentina were only 
minutes away from going to war (Smink, 2008). Nevertheless, this has not meant the 
disappearance of diplomatic controversies with neighbouring countries. For instance, in 
2005 Chile was left on the verge of an energy crisis when then-President Nestor Kirchner 
suspended a gas exportation treaty owing to a domestic supply deficit (Cardoso, 2007). 
Chile recalled its ambassador to Argentina and the media of both countries revealed the 
lack of trust between the governments (Clarín, 2006). The situation was partially solved 
when Argentina began to import gas from Bolivia but exclusively for internal use, given 
that a referendum in the latter country explicitly established that not even ‘a molecule’ of 
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gas could be sold to Chile (Keller, 2006; Van Der Ree, 2010). More worryingly, some 
international media interpreted the episode as a failure for Chilean diplomacy (Power in 
Latin America, 2004). 
 
UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE ‘WAR OF THE PACIFIC’ 
 
Undoubtedly, the main focus of regional tensions has been with Bolivia and Peru. Both 
countries joined forces against Chile between 1879 and 1883 during the ‘War of the 
Pacific’ (Beckman, 2009), a conflict driven mainly by the ambition to control the nitrate 
fields on Bolivian territory. By the end of the war, Chile had increased its territory by 
one-third, securing for itself invaluable mineral resources. Conversely, Bolivia lost the 
city of Antofagasta and with it, access to the Pacific Ocean, while the Peruvian city of 
Arica was annexed to Chile’s territory after a 2-year occupation of the capital Lima by 
the Chilean army (Beckman, 2009). 
 
Regardless of the political tendency of its governments, the loss of the coastal access 
became one of the axes of Bolivian foreign policy, especially in its relations with Chile. It 
was not until the second half of the 1970s, when both countries were under dictatorships, 
that an agreement seemed somewhat closer, with Chile offering a corridor to the sea in 
exchange for an equivalent area ceded by Bolivia. However, some of the factors that 
conspired against it were Peru’s lack of support (whose opinion must be part of any 
agreement regarding this issue) as well as the fierce opposition of the Bolivian media, 
which published maps of large portions of Bolivia under Chilean sovereignty. Some 
sectors of the Bolivian army withdrew their backing of the proposal, and negotiations 
were brought to an end (Beckman, 2009). 
 
Although peace was maintained, diplomatic relations between both countries were 
broken in 1978 and since then, there have been constant tensions, also expressed in the 
media. To mention a few examples, in June 2011, a Bolivian military patrol illegally 
entered the Chilean territory; after they were sent back to their country, Bolivian 
President Evo Morales decided to award the soldiers medals. Pictures of the men 
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receiving their awards from hands of Morales were given wide exposure in the press, 
television and social media in both countries, spurring one of the tensest moments of 
recent times (Los Tiempos, 2011). Furthermore, Evo Morales later announced his 
intention to present a case against Chile in the International Court of Justice (Castillo, 
2011) to recover the coastal access, and assured his army that Bolivians would soon get 
their sea back (La Razón, 2011). The Chilean response came in November 2011, when 
President Sebastián Piñera announced that ‘our armed forces are ready to defend our sea’ 
(La Razón, 2011). In September 2012, another impasse occurred, when Evo Morales 
demanded maritime access during a speech at the United Nations (AFP, 2012), to which 
Sebastián Piñera later replied ‘We will defend, with all the strength of the world, our 
territory, our sea, our sky and our sovereignty’ (Emol, 2012). 
 
The ‘War of the Pacific’ also left deep scars with Peru. Like Bolivia, Peru felt humiliated 
by the outcome of the conflict and witnessed how its neighbour enjoyed a new wealth 
thanks to the mineral resources found in former Peruvian territory (Van Der Ree, 2010). 
As a result, a gradual anti-Chilean sentiment began to play a relevant role in Peruvian 
politics, according to which, Chile was perceived as an aggressive, imperialistic country 
(Van Der Ree, 2010). More importantly, although both countries signed a Free Trade 
Agreement in 2006, this anti-Chilenism has sometimes become an obstacle for trade 
relations. In 2009, when the media in Peru disclosed the story of an alleged spy who was 
providing strategic information to Chile, a group of Peruvian representatives questioned 
the constitutional legitimacy of such an agreement (AFP, 2009). Furthermore, although 
he later claimed to have been misunderstood, the domestic and international media gave 
wide coverage to a story in which then-President Alan Garcia called Chile a republiqueta 
or ‘banana republic’ (Cooperativa, 2009). Indeed, a year earlier, during Garcia’s 
administration, Peru presented the aforementioned lawsuit against Chile in the 
International Court of Justice, disputing the maritime border between the two countries 
(BBC News, 2008). Finally, the election of Ollanta Humala as President in 2011 was met 
with suspicion in Chile, because of some of his statements after his presidential 
candidacy in 2005, when he said, ‘we are an invaded country; economically, by Chilean 
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capital, and physically as well … . What does it mean to be anti-Chilean? To be a good 
Peruvian, nothing else’ (Van Der Ree, 2010). 
 
REPOSITIONING CHILE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Generally speaking, the Chilean reaction – from some authorities, politicians, media and 
even academics – has been to hold that ‘there is nothing to negotiate’ (see, for example, 
the interview with a former Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Durán, 2011). The 
argument given is that these events are actually political tactics used by the neighbouring 
governments to shift the attention of its citizens from domestic conflicts towards issues of 
foreign policy (Briones, 2011). Accordingly, in terms of public diplomacy or nation 
branding, the actions carried out by Chile have been extremely scarce, or have at least 
had very little impact. Some exceptions have been the organization of joint events – such 
as the aforementioned Dakar Rally held between Chile, Argentina and nowadays Peru 
(Dakar, 2013), moments of ease in the media such as the attention paid by Bolivians to 
one of their fellow countrymen who was part of the group of 33 miners rescued in 2010 
(Barrionuevo, 2010), and Chile’s failed attempt to post tourism advertisements in Lima’s 
main airport (Charpentier, 2012). 
 
Although the limited financial resources and the relevance of trade may suggest that it is 
reasonable for Chile to concentrate its public diplomacy and nation branding efforts on its 
major economic partners, the country seems to be experiencing a sort of backfire. Some 
of the aforementioned controversies have become obstacles for sustaining good 
commercial relations with the neighbouring countries, as well as posing problems for 
Chile’s energy supply, and even arousing concern for the nation’s security. Furthermore, 
these disputes have been echoed by the media, not only in Latin America, but also in the 
rest of the world (for example, The Economist, 2007; Castillo, 2011; Schipani, 2012). As 
a result, Chile’s global reputation has been somewhat tarnished, with some reporters 
portraying it as an ‘isolated country’, ‘the rich kid on the block’ or ‘the new Phoenicians 
of Latin America’ (Rother, 2004), and with publications like The Economist openly 
backing Bolivia’s coastal demands, calling Chile’s position ‘anachronistic’ (The 
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Economist, 2003). Moreover, it seems that Chile has been confronted with the limits of 
its soft power, not only with its direct neighbours but also with other Latin American 
countries, for instance, upon attempting to build an alliance with Ecuador in order to 
strengthen its case against Peru in the International Court of Justice. Ecuador’s response 
was at best, ambiguous, and the government of Rafael Correa ended up signing territorial 
agreements with Peru that arguably left Chile in a more fragile position (UPI, 2011). 
 
It thus comes to light that, without abandoning the efforts it currently devotes to 
strengthening relations with the United States, Europe and Asia, Chile needs to develop a 
more active strategy of public diplomacy and nation branding towards Latin America. In 
doing so, Chile could partially mitigate some of the unfavourable perceptions it has 
among the citizens of its neighbouring countries. This matter becomes particularly 
relevant upon observing that, on certain occasions, the elites of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia 
and Peru have agreed on political and economic issues, such as during the presidencies of 
Ricardo Lagos in Chile, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia and Alejandro Toledo in 
Peru. However, these agreements could sometimes not come into effect because of the 
unpopularity of the proposed policies among the general public, who perceived them as 
too favourable for Chile. Perhaps, one of the most obvious examples are the ‘gas wars’ in 
Bolivia, the uprising that followed Sánchez de Lozada’s proposition to sell gas to the 
United States using Chile as a route and which forced him to put an abrupt end to his 
administration (Van Der Ree, 2010). 
 
Although a potential public diplomacy towards Latin America must obviously be aligned 
with Chile’s main foreign policy goals, its implementation should perhaps show a slightly 
different approach to those efforts aimed at other regions. First, its driver should not be 
exclusively trade – an issue that has also guided Chile’s relations with the region, and 
which, as discussed before, has already met with some obstacles (Van Der Ree, 2010; 
Fuentes and Fuentes, forthcoming) –, but rather the creation of alliances with citizens of 
these countries and the projection of a more appealing image of Chile. Thus, the 
emphasis should not be on the portrayal of Chile as a different nation in Latin America – 
as the iceberg of 1992 did in Seville – but instead as a reliable friend, sharing a common 
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history of brotherhood with Bolivia, Peru and Argentina. Second, given that the tensions 
have repeatedly been exposed and fed by the media, the strategy should place particular 
emphasis not only on controlling potential areas of conflict that might arise in the media, 
but also on proposing subjects that may contribute to promoting a more positive country 
image. For instance, instead of hiding some of the social conflicts it has recently 
experienced, Chile may perhaps openly address and discuss them, in order to strengthen 
its democratic credentials and project an image of leadership in these areas. 
 
Third, although potential communication campaigns in these countries might follow 
similar patterns to the ones aimed at other regions (press trips, meetings with foreign 
correspondents, use of social media), they should also pay attention to the opportunities 
offered by each country or, using the terminology of the literature in public diplomacy, 
they should do more ‘listening’ (Cull, 2008). For example, it is interesting to note that, 
although the relations between the governments of Carlos Mesa, from Bolivia, and 
Ricardo Lagos, from Chile, were particularly difficult in the mid-2000s (Camargo, 2004), 
at the very same time, ‘Operación Fama’, Bolivia’s first reality television show, 
premiered on local television, with a group of young aspiring celebrities competing with 
each other every week to win a trip to take singing lessons, precisely, in Chile (El Mundo 
de Bolivia, 2011). Perhaps, for the contestants of ‘Operación Fama’, Chile was not only a 
rival or an aggressive nation, but also a place full of new opportunities to materialize their 
dreams. 
 
Likewise, these actions should be coordinated with other public and private efforts. 
Alongside the existing trade relations between Chile and these countries, there have been 
attempts to position Chile as a centre for medicine within the region (Santiago Salud, 
2010), proposals of joining efforts with Peru in the mining industry (Andina, 2012) and 
suggestions to develop a system of scholarships for students from neighbouring countries 
(La Tercera, 2010). Perhaps, a good example to follow would be the agreement between 
Argentina and Chile to organize the Dakar Rally – together with ASO, the French 
company behind this motorcycle and car race – from 2009 on (Dakar, 2013). The 
governments and several private institutions of both countries have been involved in the 
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race, and Chile and Argentina have been rewarded with substantial media exposure and 
profits (Impulso Negocios, 2011). The fact that from 2012 onwards Peru has joined the 
race provides an excellent opportunity to amend ties with this nation. In addition, there 
are several projects carried out by the Chilean Agency of International Cooperation 
(AGCI, 2013), which attempt to foster integration between people from Chile, Argentina, 
Peru and Bolivia, and may deserve a more substantial visibility. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
During the past 20 years, Chile has implemented a series of strategies to improve its 
reputation in the eyes of the world. In a similar way to other small and medium-sized 
states Chile has attempted to counteract its lack of visibility, alongside with the constant 
references to the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in the foreign media. These efforts 
have mainly been aimed at Europe, the United States and Asia, and have tried to position 
Chile as a stable and blossoming nation that escapes some of the unfavourable 
stereotypes associated with Latin America. Although these efforts have been only 
moderately successful in promoting new perspectives for Chile, they have clearly 
succeeded in publicizing positive images of the country in moments of crisis, such as the 
earthquake of 2010 and the rescue of 33 miners in the same year. In these cases, the 
general portrayal of Chile in the international media has been quite positive and the 
authorities have taken proper advantage of it. 
 
However, on the basis of an analysis of news reports, a different perspective arises upon 
observing the neighbouring nations. People from Bolivia, Peru and, to a lesser extent, 
Argentina have a less positive image of Chile, and this issue has impacted the relation 
with these countries particularly in areas such as trade, energy and even security. On a 
global level, the international reputation of Chile has also been affected and has led the 
country to be labelled at certain moments an ‘isolated’ nation. Therefore, this article 
suggests that an extension of nation branding and public diplomacy initiatives to the 
neighbouring countries may contribute to ease some tensions with them. 
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These potential efforts could also serve Chile as a future reserve of soft power. At the 
time of writing this article, it was expected that the International Court of Justice would 
soon deliver its verdict on the territorial claims made by Peru. No matter how favourable 
or unfavourable the outcome may turn out to be, Chile should be prepared to counteract 
any potential focus of domestic or international tensions in its relationship with Peru. 
 
Future research may further develop some of the observations made in this article and 
overcome its evident limitations, going beyond an examination of news reports and 
including interviews with authorities or specialists in the countries involved as well as 
audience analysis. However, the example of the young talents of ‘Operación Fama’ in 
Bolivia, who dreamed of taking singing lessons in Chile, might serve as inspiration for 
future actions that could promote a better understanding between these historically linked 
countries. 
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